Thought for the day...

This is the moment when we must make the necessary pedagogical and institutional adjustments to a pervasively connected culture. That survey from last year found that even at Kindergarten level, two-thirds of parents were willing to buy a mobile for their children – if schools integrated the device into their pedagogy. But the survey also pointed to opposition within the schools themselves...Hyperconnected Education


There are many freedoms here but we have to free ourselves as practitioners first...

Falling and Throwness

From Being and Time:

Idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity characterize the way in which, in an everyday manner, Dasein is its 'there' - the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world. As definite characteristics, these are not present-at-hand in Dasein, but help make up its Being. In these, and in the way they are interconnected in their being, there is revealed a basic kind of Being which belongs to everydayness; we call this the "falling" of Dasein. (p. 219)

Idle talk and ambiguity, having seen everything, develop the suposition that Dasein's disclosedness. which is so available and so prevalent, can guarantee to Dasein that all possibilities of its Being will be secure, genuine and full. Through the self certainty and decidedness of the "they", it gets spread abroad increasingly that there is no need of authentic understanding or the state-of-mind that goes with it. The supposition of the "they" that one is for which everything is 'in the best of order' and all doors are open. Falling Being-in-the-world, which tempts itself, is at the same time tranquillizing.
However, this tranquillity in inauthentic Being does not seduce one into stagnation and inactivity, but drives one into uninhibited 'hustle'. Being-fallen into the 'world' does not now somehow come to rest. (p. 222)

The tempting tranquillization aggravates the falling. Versatile curiosity and restlessly "knowing it all" masquerade as a universal understanding of Dasein. (p. 222)

Falling Being-in-the-world is not only tempting and tranquillizing it is at the same time alienating. (p. 222)

The alienation of falling - at once tempting and tranquillizing - leads by its own movement, to Dasein's getting entangled in itself. (p. 223)

Is this of playing and being played?

Dasein plunges out of itself into itself, into the groundlessness and nullity of inauthentic everydayness. But this plunge remains hidden from Dasein by the way things have been publically interpreted, so much so, indeed, that it gets interpreted as a way of 'ascending' and 'living concretely'. (p. 223)

Is this a description of Dasein subsumed by 'the game'?

Dasein's facticity is such that as long as it is what it is, Dasein remains in the throw, and is sucked into the turbulence of the "they's" inauthenticity. Throwness, in which facticity lets itself be seen phenomenally, belongs to Dasein, for which, in its Being, that very Being is an issue. Dasein exists factically. (p. 223)

Dasein can fall only because Being-in-the-world understandingly with a state-of-mind is an issue for it. On the other hand, authentic existence is not something which floats above the falling everdayness; existentially, it is only a modified way in which such everydayness is seized upon. (p. 224)

Might playfulness as a state-of-mind allow Dasein the freedom to travel the roads between the authentic and inauthentic?

This freedom might be an understanding act of travelling. I am tempted to say is not a resistance to falling and that it may be falling with authenticity. Embracing the authentic and inauthentic, what is Dasein's own, what is shared and what is other. Is there a possibility that in this travel itself a transcendence of what is authentic and inauthentic may occur?

Falling reveals an essential ontological structure of Dasein itself. Far from determining its nocturnal side, it constitutes all Dasein's days in their everydayness. (p. 224)

Authentic learning (I use this phrase with trepidation) seems to require immersion in the everyday with the awareness of that leads to deeper understanding. Playfulness may be able to provide a state-of-mind that allows for a freedom as understanding of moving between (or transcending?) the authentic and inauthentic ways of Being. What else might be required? Can playfulness as a state-of-mind be further explored so it has as its understanding authentic learning as well as freedom? Or could a further state-of-mind, with its own system of understanding, disclosedness and modes of discourse etc, fill this void intertwined with playfulness? If so, would this state-of-mind always be the same or differ under changing circumstances? Or have I just go too far?

And a quote to make me hold my horses:

The being of that disclosedness is constituted by states-of-mind, understanding, and discourse. Its everyday kind of Being is characterized by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. These show us the movement of falling, with temptation, tranquillizing, alienation, and entanglement as its essintial characteristics.
But with this analysis, the whole existential constitution of Dasein has been laid bare inits principal features, and we have obtained the phenomenal ground for a 'comprehensive' Interpretation of Dasein's Being as care. (p. 224)

Meaning and intelligibility

Cheers enowning for pointing out something I had missed in Being and Time.

Idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity.

From Being and Time:

...when Dasein maintains itself in idle talk, it is - as Being-in-the-world - cut off from its promary and primordially genuine relationships-of-Being towards the world, towards its very being-in. p. (214)

The basic state of sight shows itself in a particular tendency-of-Being which belongs to everydayness - the tendency towards 'seeing'. We designate this tendency by the term "curiosity", which characteristically is not confined to seeing, but expresses a tendency towards a peculiar way of letting the world be encountered by us in perception. (p. 214)

[Aristotle] The care for seeing is essential to man's being. (p. 215)

What is to be said about this tendency just to perceive? Which existential state of Dasein will become intelligible in the phenomenon of curiosity? Being in the world is proximally absorbed in the world of concern. This concern is guided by circumspection, which discovers the ready-to-hand and preserves it as thus discovered. (p. 216)

When curiosity has become free, however, it concerns itself with seeing, not in order to understand what is seen (that is, to come into a Being towards it) but in order to see. (p. 216)

Curiosity is everywhere and nowhere. This mode of Being-in-the-world reveals a new kind of Being of everyday Dasein - a kind in which Dasein is constantly uprooting itself. Idle talk controls even the ways in which one may be curious. It says what one "must" have read and seen. In being everywhere and nowhere, curiosity is delivered over to idle talk. These two everyday modes-of-being for discourse and sight are not just present-at-hand side by side in their tendency to uproot, but either of these ways-to-be drags the other one with it. (p. 217)

This brings to mind some staffroom conversations I have had!

When, in our everyday Being-with-one-another, we encounter the sort of thing which is accessible to to everyone, and about which anyone can say anything, it soon becomes impossible to decide what is disclosed in a genuine understanding, and what is not. This ambiguity extends not only to the world, but just as much to Being-with-one-another as such, and even to Dasein's Being towards itself. (p. 217)

Thus Dasein's understanding in the "they" is constantly going wrong in its projects, as regards the genuine possibilities of Being. Dasein is always ambiguously 'there' - that is to say, in that public disclosedness of Being-with-one-another where the loudest idle talk and the most ingenious curiosity keep 'things moving', where, in an everyday manner, everything (and at the bottom nothing) is happening. (pp. 218-9)

Being-with-one-another in the "they" is by no means an indifferent side-by-side-ness in which everything has been settled, but rather an intent, ambiguous watching of one another, a secret and reciprocal listening-in. Under the mask of "for-one-another", an "against-one-another" is in play.
In this connection, we must notice that ambiguity does not first arise from aiming explicitly at disguise or distortion, and that it is not something which the individual Dasein first conjures up. (p. 219)

Could authentic learning be thought of as a mode of discourse which avoids idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity as framed by Heidegger? This may be direction for the nuts and bolts of my inquiry!

Being there and discourse

More from Heidegger: The fundamental existentialia which constitute the

Being of the "there", the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world, are states-of-mind and understanding. In understanding, there lurks the possibility of interpretation - that is, of appropriating what is understood. In so far as a state-of-mind is equiprimordial with an act of understanding, it maintains itself in a certain understanding. (p. 203)

Does learning - when described with assertion and interpretation - feed directly back into freedom as an understanding which discloses playfulness? Possibly - a sense of freedom may engender learning and learning may enhance the understanding that is freedom. This is interesting cold learning be associated with freedom in addition to other understandings?

In clarifying the third signification of assertion as communication (speaking forth), we were led to the concepts of "saying" and "speaking", to which we had purposely given no attention up to that point. The fact that language now becomes our theme for the first time will indicate that this phenomenon has its roots in the existential constitution of Dasein's disclosedness. The existential-ontological foundation of language is discourse or talk. This phenomenon is one of which we have been making constant use already in our foregoing Interpretation of state-of-mind, understanding, interpretation, and assertion... (p. 203)

Discourse is existentially equiprimordial with state-of-mind and understanding. The intelligibility of something has always been articulated, even before there is any appropriative interpretation of it. Discourse is the Articulation of intelligibility. Therefore it underlies both interpretation and assertion. (pp. 203-4)

The way in which discourse gets expressed is language. (p. 204)

I would prefer not to limit discourse to language. Discourse with oneself and others seems to me to have many other forms - of which language is an important, shared and obvious one. I would like to think that intelligibility can be articulated in many ways.

Discoursing or talking is the way in which we articulate 'significantly' the intelligibility of being-in-the-world. Being-with belongs to Being-in-the-world, which in every case maintains itself in some definite way of concernful Being-with-one-another. (p. 204)

'Communication' in which one makes assertions - giving information, for instance - is a special case of that communication which is grasped in principle existentially. In the more general kind of communication, the Articulation of Being with one another understandingly is constituted. Through it a co-state-of-mind gets 'shared', and so does the understanding Being-with. Communication is never anything like a conveying of experiences, such as opinions or wishes, from the interior of ones subject into the interior of another. Dasein-with is already essentially manifest in a co-state-of-mind and a co-understanding. In discourse Being-with becomes 'explicitly' shared; that is to say, it is already, but it is unshared as something that has not been taken hold of and appropriated. (p. 205)

In talking, Dasein expresses itself not because it has, in the first instance, been encapsulated as something 'internal' over against something outside, but because as Being-in-the-world it is already 'outside' when it understands. What is expressed is precisely this Being-outside - that is to say, the way one currently has a state-of-mind (mood), which we have shown to pertain to the full disclosedness of Being-in. Being-in and its state-of-mind are known in discourse and indicated in language by intonation, modulation, the tempo of talk, 'the way of speaking'. In 'poetical' discourse, the communication of the existential possibilities of one's state-of-mind can become an aim in itself, and this amounts to a disclosing of existence. (p. 205)

Ah, a sigh of relief. For me, at least, this seems to mean we do not have to limit our discourse to language, although we cannot deny its importance in Being-with. These quotes make me smile too - I am really interested in the co-state-of-mind, in particular in playfulness as a co-state-of-mind and the freedoms subsequently disclosed.

Keeping silent authentically is possible only in genuine discoursing. To be able to be kept silent, Dasein, must have something to say - that is, it must have at its disposal an authentic and rich disclosedness in itself. (p. 208)

Intriguing...

Our Interpretation of language has been designed merely to point out the ontological 'locus' of this phenomenon in Desein's state of Being... (p. 210)

Assertion and interpretation

Assertion is not a free-floating kind of behaviour which in its own right, might be capable of disclosing entities in general in a primary way: on the contrary it always maintains itself on the basis of Being-in-the-world... ...any assertion requires a fore-having of whatever is disclosed; and this is what it points out by way of giving something a definite character... ...Thus any assertion requires fore-sight; in this the predicate which we assign and make stand out, gets loosened, so to speak, from its unexpressed inclusion in the entity itself. (p. 199)

When an assertion is made, some fore-conception is always implied; but it remains for the most part inconspicuous, because the language already hides in itself a developed way of conceiving. Like any interpretation whatever, assertion necessarily has fore-having, a fore-sight, and a fore-conception as its existential foundations. (p. 199)

...assertion cannot disown its ontological origin from an interpretation which understands. (p. 201)

Between the kind of interpretation which is still wholly wrapped up in the concernful understanding and the extreme opposite case of a theoretical assertion about something present-at-hand, there are many intermediate graduations: assertions about the happenings in the environment, accounts of the ready-to-hand, 'reports on the Situation', the recording and fixing of the 'facts of the case', the description of a state of affairs, the narration of something that has befallen. We cannot trace back these 'sentences' to theoretical statements without essentially perverting their meaning. Like the theoretical statements themselves, they have their 'source' in circumspective interpretation. (p. 201)

The λόγος gets experienced as something present-at-hand and Interpreted as such, while at the same time the entities which it points out have the meaning of presence-at-hand. This meaning of Being is left undifferentiated and uncontrasted with other possibilities of Being, so that Being in the sense of a formal Being-something becomes fused with it simultaneously, and we are able even to obtain a clear-cut division between these two realms. (p. 203)

I need to reflect and explore further assertion, interpretation and learning. Certainly what is being described here in reminiscent of learning. Reflecting on playfulness, freedom and learning; it will be interesting to see whether the tenuous associations so far explored can maintain and strengthen themselves as they unfold and enfold. Or will something new emerge?

Back to Being and Time - Assertion (Judgment)

From a previous blog:

This process of interpretation and building meaning could be one way of starting to define learning.

The ability to move between possible interpretations and meanings is a freedom and requires playfulness. In this sense the understanding could be freedom - understanding and choosing possibilities as possibilities.

Learning can be assisted by the freedom to move between, subsume and synthesise interpretations and meanings.

On further reflection, it is hard to imagine learning without understanding and pursuing possibilities as possibilities that is freedom as I have started to define it.

Heidegger introduces us to a place for 'assertion' (judgment?):

All interpretation is grounded on understanding. That which has been articulated as such in interpretation and sketched out beforehand in the understanding in general as something articulable, is the meaning. In so far as assertion ('judgment') is grounded on understanding and presents us with a derivative form in which an interpretation has been carried out, it too 'has' a meaning. Yet this meaning cannot be defined as something which occurs 'in' a judgment along with judging itself. (p. 195)

In what follows, we give three significations to the term "assertion". These are drawn from the phenomenon which is thus designated, they are connected among themselves, and in their unity they encompass the full structure of assertion.

1. The primary signification of "assertion" is "pointing out". In this we adhere to the primordial meaning of... ...letting and entity be seen for itself. I the assertion 'The hammer is too heavy', what is discovered for sight is not a 'meaning', but an entity in the way that it is ready-to-hand'...

2. "Assertion" means no less than "predication". We 'assert' a 'predicate' of a 'subject', and the 'subject' is given a definite character by the 'predicate'. In this signification of "assertion", that which is put forward as assertion is not the predicate, but 'the hammer itself'... ...Every predication is what it is, only as a pointing-out. The second signification of "assertion" has its foundation in the first. Within this pointing-out, the elements which are Articulated in predication - the subject and predicate - arise. It is not by giving something a definite character that we first discover that which shows itself - the hammer - as such; but when we give it such a character, our seeing gets restricted to it in the first instance, so that by this explicit restriction of our view, that which is manifest may be explicitly manifest in its definite character. In giving something a definite character, we must, in the first instance, take a step back when confronted with that which is already manifest - the hammer is too heavy. In 'setting down the subject', we dim entities down to focus in 'that hammer there', so that by thus dimming the, down we let that which is manifest be seen in its own definite character as a character that can be determined. Setting down the subject, setting down the predicate, and setting down the two together, are thoroughly 'apophantical' in the strict sense of the word.

3. "Assertion" means "communication". As communication, it is directly related to "assertion" in the first and second significations. It is letting someone see with us what we have pointed out by way of giving it a definite character... ...That which is put forward in the is something which can be passed along in 'further retelling'. There is a widening of the range of that mutual sharing which sees. But at the same time, what has been pointed out may become veiled again in this further retelling, although even the kind of knowing which arises as hearsay (whether knowledge that something is the case or merely an acquaintance with something always has the entity itself in view and does not 'give assent' to some 'valid meaning' which has been passed around. Even hearsay in a Being-in-the-world, and a Being towards what it has heard. (pp. 196-8)

If we bring together the three significations of 'assertion' which we have analysed, and get a unitary view of the full phenomenon, then we may define "assertion" as "a pointing-out which gives something a definite character and which communicates". (p. 199)

A brief methodology...

Freedom, playfulness and learning have deep significance for me personally. In order to inquire into these in a meaningful manner I will first have to consider my own relationship with them. It seems natural to consider these through narratives which can be interpreted in light of others exploration on playfulness and freedom. These narratives will be inspired by further interpretation of works by philosophers and researchers who have detailed their own perspectives on freedom, including Martin Heidegger (2002, 1982), John Dewey (1989), Maxine Greene (1988) and Rudolf Steiner (1964, 1894). Other texts to inform the narratives will come from stories from my own practice and personal histories.

This autoethnographic (Chase, 2006, p. 660) approach will aim to envisage frames-of-understanding which can be shared, reflected on and reshaped by others within my community of practice. These frames-of-understanding will have their own shared narratives and interpretations informing how they might be shared and utilised within a wider community. This process of framing, sharing, re-framing and sharing again is intended to provide direction and motive for my research. Distinctions between methodology and subject of the research will be interdependent. These interdependencies are worthwhile and necessary to consider themselves. For example, by reflecting on the four traditions that inform Valerie Bentz and Jeremy Shapiro’s Mindful Inquiry,

• Phenomenology: a description and analysis of consciousness and experience


• Hermeneutics: analysis and interpretation of texts in context


• Critical Social Theory: analysis of domination and oppression with a view to changing it


• Buddhism: spiritual practice that allows one to free oneself from suffering and illusion in several ways, e.g., becoming more aware (Bentz & Shapiro, 1998, p. 6),

the methodologies outlined so far have strong resonances with all of these traditions, as does the research itself. All participants will be following, but not limited to, aspects these traditions. Indeed the frames-of-understanding in themselves will in all probability owe some gratitude to them. The research will be guided, honed and sustained through its own logic of understanding.

And a further note:

From my research there should be some direction in enabling what Parker J. Palmer describes as ‘Good talk about good pedagogy’ (1998, p. 144). With appropriate playfulness, possibility should emerge from the communities closest to the practice – which by its nature and manifestation is problematic. The participants will be given a voice through reflection on and application of the metaphors of freedom and playfulness, with the specific ambition of assisting them with improving their practice. Through their voices, it is intended, that a sharable and accessible frame-of-understanding for transforming practice will be described, tested and refined.

How might freedom, playfulness and learning within practice be shared?

Explorations of philosophical perspectives on freedom, playfulness and learning become more interesting and intriguing when considering how they may relate to practice. For anyone involved in educational practice there are many possibilities, of which only a few may be pursued. There are many ways that the choice to move between these possibilities may be limited, through intrinsic, perceived or extrinsic factors. Using the shared metaphors associated with playfulness and freedom could provide a catalyst for possibility. Some aspects of practice may mirror playfulness as a state-of-mind. For example Max van Manen (1999) examines some of what is intangible within practice – outlining practice as explanation stopper, practice as lived experience, (un)reflective practice and the complexity of practice. On (un)reflective practice he states:

…the theory of reflective practice seems to overestimate the possibility of introspective "reflection on action while acting" (van Manen 1994, 1995). Phenomenologically it is very difficult, if not impossible, for teachers to be immersed in interactive or dialogic activities with their students while simultaneously stepping back from the activity. (van Manen, 1999)

Supporting teachers while they explore and embody the complexity and variety of learning in practice provides the environment for this study. It also provides direction for inquiry. If it is impossible to be reflective when immersed within practice then where does that leave the practitioner? Do they feel free to:

enable students to learn – can practice have playfulness as its state-of-mind?
act or do they feel played within games of their own or others construction?
explore their own and shared possibility?

Back - updated working definitions for play etc

I have made some progress going through the candidacy process. Some of which will emerge later. For now I have tinkered a bit with my original working definitions:

Play

Play has its own mode of being which we will call a game. This being exists only in the world and is not aware of its own being – it does not have Dasein character. It does however require participants with Dasein character to give the game importance and make it matter.

Players

The players are the participants in the game. In order for them to be players then they must take the game seriously. All players are played by the game and lost to the game while they are playing it. They are concerned only with being-in-the-world, with the they only as it exists within the world of the game. Their 'authentic being' is lost to them. The game can not be disclosed to the world without the players being predisposed to being players.


Playing

Playing is giving oneself to the game and the play - in as much as the game has to be taken seriously one is played by the game. It is essential to be part of the they and therefore it is unlikely for Dasein's authentic being to be disclosed. It is useful to note that this being lost in the they is neither inherently negative nor positive.

Being Playful (moving away from the direct influence of Gadamer)

Being playful allows one to be able to play with what is serious and the games that matter within one's Being-in-the-world. Being playful can make one feel as though one is outside the game or games, it also can transform what is serious into a game. In the constructing a new game, which may be more a complex or a simplified version of it constituents, the pitfalls of other games are created. This game is still part of Being-in-the-world. Being playful is Dasein's conscious construction, and thus is more likely to phenomenologically disclose aspects of 'authentic being'.

Playfulness

Playfulness as a mode of state-of-mind is of Dasein and cannot apprehend itself without losing authenticity. Playfulness envisions the possibilities of our 'authentic being' to be realised within Being-in-the-world, and the possibilities of Being-in-the-world to inform our 'authentic being'. If we accept this then it can be said that Playfulness is a conduit and phenomenologically is of 'authentic being'.

Paraphrasing Heidegger (1926, p180):

That which playfulness plays is that very entity which is played - Dasein.

Research Quest: Ethics and being

In what ways will my inquiry take my values, and those of others, into account?

I am struggling for a way to articulate this, for me at the moment I see whirls that are both beautifully and frustratingly circular. These whirls are just glimpses of a philosophy of freedom, playfulness and learning.

My inquiry aims to free people to learn through playfulness. This playfulness is not a trivial one - it is a state-of-mind. This state-of-mind is with us all the time and can disclose freedom or freedoms absence depending on how caught you are up in your seriousness or your play. An important point here is that permission and judgement of freedom to learn comes from within each individual - in the context of my inquiry the aim would be to do this through playfulness. Being-in-the-inquiry means being valued and being valuing - inwardly and outwardly. Without this then the basis of the inquiry, its philosophy and phronesis, have to be questioned and regenerated or more to the point question and regenerate themselves.

In what ways will the inquiry take ethics into account?

Ethically there are real issues around messing with the stuff of being. Experimenting with a state-of-mind could be considered ethically fraught. However the inquiry is there not to free people to learn, but to allow people to be free to learn. They are the instruments that measure this freedom as well as its author. Permission to continue is not a tacit or fleeting - it is continual and reflective. The inquiry will have its own ethical journey - moving through and intertwining the shared ethics of those within it.

What is the place of myself and my "voice" in the inquiry?

My voice is where I start. Is there a choice here? My 'I' has to be explicit in order for me to transcend what is mine about freedom and playfulness and discover what is and can be shared. Throughout the enfolding of my inquiry what is and can be shared will become mine to a certain extent - well awareness of these at least. My 'voice' will respond to and guide the inquiry in order to allow other voices to be heard - participants, literature, the inquiry itself...

What are my ways of being mindful in research?

I will refer to mindful inquiry that I have taken quotes from before. We can refer to the four knowledge traditions that mindful inquiry is based on:

• Phenomenology: a description and analysis of consciousness and experience
• Hermeneutics: analysis and interpretation of texts in context
• Critical Social Theory: analysis of domination and oppression with a view to changing it
• Buddhism: spiritual practice that allows one to free oneself from suffering and illusion in several ways, e.g., becoming more aware (1998, p. 6)

From my previous post I think that my ways of being mindful align strongly with these four traditions. What may or not be so clear is that the inquiry is intended to enable participants within it to follow these four traditions themselves. Now that is an interesting line of inquiry...

What are my ways of being scholarly in research and writing?

I have already touched on ways I might be scholarly. In short my research and how it is communicated should be open to be schooled (I see fish here rather than classrooms) by literature, participants, itself and so on... My research and writing should have playfulness and freedom to be scholarly - as those should within it.

Questions: (c) Pugh, R & Yaxley, B. 2005

Bentz, V. M., & Shapiro, J. J. (1998). Mindful inquiry in social research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage

What forms might my research take? (first try)

As I have been reading over the past couple of weeks I have been reflecting on what shape my study may take. I feel that it has to be open to many paths - but there still needs to be some structure or form. One way to look at this is by revisiting the purposes of my research.

For me freedom and playfulness, as perspective and practice, has been transforming professionally and personally, with colleagues, students, friends and family. Reflection on the freedom, playfulness and being has is empowering for my transformations. There is commonality and otherness about this sense of transformation that emerges when in dialogue with others about freedom, playfulness and being. Transformation occurs within a person, group, community etcetera, not something that can be applied from the outside. It appears to me that the natures of freedom, playfulness and transformation require that all three are explicit aspects of the research. That is the inquiry would not attempt to distance itself from the participants. The intention would be for participants to be able to transform themselves and participate in the transformation of others. Actually, it is probably enough for them to be able to identify that which is of transformation for themselves and others. How might I achieve this?

As an initial scaffolding for my thoughts about the process my research may take I will look at a generic structure, in the form of phases, proposed by Denzin & Lincoln (Table 1.1, p. 23, 2005).


Phase 1: The researcher as Multicultural Subject

Revisiting an exploration of my own traditions I feel that I need to further explore freedom and playfulness deeply, from a personal point of view and as a member of many communities. This includes exploring the traditions I embody from my family as well as those gained through research and dialogue with others.

The generation of a sharable construct of freedom and playfulness will be hampered, and possibly subverted, without a deep understanding of who I am and how I am evolving in relation to these ways of being.

Freedom, play, playfulness etcetera have lively, circuitous and interwoven histories. Bringing some of these together in new ways to suit my purposes is the parallel first step with situating myself and my shared histories. My guess is that throughout my research these two aspects will take on a life of their own - there will have to be some resolution before continuing however.

Ethically, if I am attempting to engender a transformation process with freedom and playfulness it would be remiss for me not to explore as many perspectives on my own and others understanding before unleashing it on the world. The aim would be to ensure that the inquiry was at least illuminating, if not a step towards transformation, for all participants.


Phase 2: Theoretical Paradigms and Perspectives

I have already discussed that out of the broad paradigms described, my research largely appears to fall into the constructivist paradigm. With a relativism, co-creation and transferability central to the 'products' of the inquiry.

When situating myself and participating in my inquiry then the paradigms associated with critical theory may provide relief and substance for all participants. When we are talking about being 'freer' to learn - having greater freedom... we have to question what limits or bestows this freedom etcetera. Feminist theory and its focus on emancipation may be informative here - emancipation through transformative inquiry?


Phase 3: Research Strategies

I have outlined above the start of my research - situating myself, in relation to freedom and playfulness as I evolve a philosophy of freedom and playfulness. I have already started evolving a philosophy of freedom and playfulness, reflecting on my personal lived experience as I proceed. There is an obvious, albeit unpredictable, path for this synthesising as I read Heidegger, Gadamer, Greene, Dewey, Steiner and so on. In situating myself I intend to record and interweave narratives from my family - an autoethnographic process. Once this has some sense of resolution - I would hope to have a sharable and accessible model, for want of a better word, for freedom and playfulness which I could use to enter dialogue with others.

These others would be people from my past, present and future who have some experience of transformation. The focus would be on inquiring into how our shared understanding of freedom and playfulness has a place in their experience of transformation and how to move to the next step of providing an environment that engenders freedom to learn and transform. This may take the form of an action research amongst a group of peers at the time.

The model cocreated could be introduced utilising critical ethnography with critical action research - taking the emancipatory and ethical lead from strategies such as feminist communitarianism. The inquiry may be informed though mindful inquiry and other global perspectives throughout.

I will aim towards forming the idiosyncratic, emergent and cohesive set strategies throughout the inquiry.


Phase 4: Methods of Collection and Analysis

In the same way the strategies will be emerging the methods of collection will adapt to suit the life of the inquiry. There will be interviews, observations, artifacts, autoethnography, textual analysis and more. It is intended that the methods of collection and analysis will be largely determined by the participants - including myself.


Phase 5: The Art, Practices, and Politics of Interpretation and Evaluation

Interpretation and evaluation will also be emergent during the inquiry - very difficult for me to imagine at this stage.


So there is a start - I need to discuss, read and reflect before the forms really take shape...


Denzin, N.K. & Lincoln, Y.S. (Ed) (2005) The SAGE handbook of qualitative research 3rd Edition, Sage Publications, California, USA.

Narrative inquiry: multiple lenses, approaches, voices (paper)

Notes from the Handbook of Qualitative Research


Contemporary narrative inquiry

I begin by outlining the a set of five analytic lenses through which contemporary researchers approach empirical material.(p. 656)

Analytic lenses

First, narrative researchers treat narrative - whether oral or written - as a distinct form of discourse. Narrative is a retrospective meaning making - the shaping or ordering of past experience. Narrative is a way of understanding one's own and other' actions, of organizing events and objects into meaningful whole, and of connecting and seeing the consequences of actions and events over time. (p. 656)

Second, narrative researchers view narratives as verbal action - doing or accomplishing something. Among other things, narrators explain, entertain, inform, defend, complain, and confirm or challenge the status quo. Whatever the particular action, when someone tells a story, he or she shapes, constructs, and performs the self, experience, and reality. When researchers treat narration as actively creative in this way, they emphasize the narrator's voice. (p. 567)

Third, narrative researchers view stories as both enabled and contained by a range of social resources and circumstances. These include the possibilities for self and reality construction that are intelligible within the narrator's community, local setting, organizational and social memberships, and cultural and historical location. While acknowledging that every instance of narrative is particular, researchers use this lens to attend to similarities and differences across narratives. (p. 657)

Fourth, narrative researchers as socially situate interactive performances - as produced in this particular setting, for this particular audience, for these particular purposes. A story told to an interviewer in a quiet relaxed setting will likely differ from the "same" story told to a reporter for a television news show, to a private journal that the writer assumes will never be read, to a roomful of people who have had similar experiences, to a social service counsellor, or to the same interviewer at a different time... ...a narrative is a joint production of narrator and listener, whether the narrative arises in naturally occurring talk, an interview, or a fieldwork setting. (p. 657)

Fifth, narrative researchers, like many other contemporary qualitative researchers, view themselves as narrators as they develop interpretations and find ways in which to present or publish their ideas about the narratives they studied... ...This means the four lenses just described make as much sense when applied to the to the researcher as they do when applied to the researched... ...narrative researchers are likely to use the first person when presenting their work, thereby emphasizing their own narrative action.(p. 657)

Diverse approaches

Without claiming to be comprehensive or exhaustive in my categories, I briefly outline five major approaches in contemporary narrative inquiry. (p. 658)

Some psychologists have developed an approach that focuses on the relationship between individuals' life stories and and the quality of their lives, especially psychosocial development. In addition to gathering extensive life stories, these researchers sometimes use common psychological tests. (p. 658)

A second approach has been developed by sociologists who highlight the "identity work" that people engage in as they construct selves within specific institutional, organizational, discursive, and local cultural contexts. Unlike the psychologists just described, who conceptualize the life story as distinguishable from the - yet having an impact on - the life, these researchers often treat narratives as lived experience. Thus they are as interested in the hows of story telling as they are in the whats of storytelling - in the narrative practices by which storytellers make use of available resources to construct recognizable selves. (p. 658)

The third approach is also sociological. Here, narrative researchers share the interest in the hows and whats of storytelling, but base their inquiry on extensive interviews about specific aspects of people's lives rather than on conversations in specific organizational contexts. These researchers are interested in how people communicate meaning through a range of linguistic practices, how their stories are embedded in the interaction between researcher and narrator, how they make sense of personal experience in relation to culturally and historic specific discourses, how they draw on, resist, and/or transform those discourses as they narrate their selves, experiences, and realities. (p. 659)

Anthropologists have led the way to a fourth approach to narrative inquiry. Some call this approach to narrative ethnography, which is transformation of both ethnographic and life history methods. Like traditional ethnography, this approach involves long-term improvement in a culture or community; like life history, it focuses heavily on one individual or on a small number of individuals. What makes the narrative ethnography distinct is that both the researcher and the researched "are presented together within a single multivocal text focused on the character and process of human encounter" (Tedlock, 1992, p. xiii) (Chase, 2005, p. 659)

A fifth approach t narrative inquiry is found in autoethnography, where researchers also turn the analytic lens on themselves and their interactions with others, but here researchers write, interpret, and/or perform their own narratives about culturally significant experiences. (p. 660)

Chase, S.E. (2005) Narrative inquiry: multiple lenses, approaches, voices. In Denzin, N.K. & Lincoln, Y.S. (Ed) The SAGE handbook of qualitative research 3rd Edition, Sage Publications, California, USA.

Tedlock, B. (1992) The beautiful and the dangerous: encounters with he Zuni Indians. New Press, New York.

Participatory action research: communicative action and the public sphere (paper)

Notes from the Handbook of Qualitative Research

Participatory research

Three particular are often used to distinguish participatory research from conventional research: shared ownership of research projects, community-based analysis of social problems, and an orientation toward community action. (p. 560)

Critical action research

Critical action research expresses a commitment to bring together broad social analysis - the self-reflexive collective self-study of practice, the way in which language is used, organization and power in a local situation, and action to improve things. (p. 560)

Classroom action research

Classroom action research typically involves the use of inquiry and data collection by teachers (often with the help from academics) with a view to teachers making judgments about how to improve their own practices... ...Primacy is given to teachers' self-understandings and judgements. The emphasis is "practical," that is, on the interpretations that the teachers and students are making and acting on in the situation. (p. 561)

Action learning

The fundamental idea of action learning is to bring people together to learn from each other's experiences. There is emphasis on studying one's own situation, clarifying what the organization is trying to achieve, working to remove obstacles. Key aspirations are organizational efficacy and efficiency, although advocates of action learning affirm the moral purpose and content of their own work and of the managers they seek to engage in the process. (p. 561)

Action science

Action science emphases the study of practice in organizational settings as a source of new understandings and improved practice. The field of action science systematically builds the relationship between academic organizational psychology and practical problems as the are experienced in organizations. It identifies two aspects of professional knowledge: (a) the formal knowledge that all competent members of the profession are thought to share and into which professionals are inducted into the group and (b) the professional knowledge of interpretation and enactment. A distinction is also made between the professional's "espoused theory" and "theories in use," and "gaps" between these are used as points of change. (p. 561)

Critical participatory action research

Although the process of participatory action research is only poorly described in terms of a mechanical sequence of steps, it is generally thought to involve a spiral of self-reflective cycles of the following:

• Planning a change
• Acting and observing the process and consequences
• Reflecting on these processes and consequences
• Replanning
  
• Acting and observing again
• Reflecting again, and so on...

...In reality, the process might not be as neat as this spiral of self-contained cycles of planning suggests... ...the process is likely to be more fluid, open, and responsive. (p. 563)

...participatory action research has seven other key features that are at least as important as the self-reflective spiral.

1. Participatory action research is a social process. Participatory action research deliberately explores the relationship between the realms of the individual and the social...
2. Participatory action research is participatory. Participatory action research engages people in examining their knowledge (understandings, skills, and values) and interpretive categories (the ways in which they interpret themselves and their action in the social and material world)...
3. Participatory action research is practical and collaborative. Participatory action research engages people in examining the social practices that link them with others in social interaction...
4. Participatory action research is emancipatory. Participatory action research aims to help people recover, release themselves from, the constraints of irrational, unproductive, unjust, and unsatisfying social structures that limit their self-development and self determination...
5. Participatory social research is critical. Participatory action research aims to help people recover, and release themselves from, the constraints embedded in the social media through which they interact - their language (discourses), their modes of work, and the social relationships of power (in which the experience affiliation and difference, inclusion and exclusion - relationships in which, grammatically speaking, they interact with others in the third, second, or first person...
6. Participatory action research is reflexive (e.g., recursive, dialectical). Participatory action research aims to help people to investigate reality in order to change it... ...it is a deliberative through which people aim to transform their practices through a spiral of cycles of critical and self-critical action and reflection...
7. Participatory action research aims to transform both theory and practice. Participatory action research does not regard either theory or practice as preeminent in the relationship between theory and practice; rather it aims to articulate and develop each in relation to the other through critical reasoning about both theory and practice. (pp. 566-8)

Kemmis, S. and McTaggart, R. (2005) Participatory action research: communicative action and the public sphere. In Denzin, N.K. & Lincoln, Y.S. (Ed) The SAGE handbook of qualitative research 3rd Edition, Sage Publications, California, USA.

Grounded theory in the 21st Century: applications for advancing social justice studies (paper)

Notes from the Handbook of Qualitative Research

Constructivist Grounded Theory

A constructivist approach emphasizes the studied phenomenon rather than the
methods of studying it. Constructivist gorunded theorists take a reflexive
stance on modes of knowing and representing studied life. That means giving close attention to empirical realities and our collected renderings of them - and locating oneself in these realities. It does not assume that impartial observers enter the research scene without an interpretive frames, biographies, and interests as well as the research context, their relationships with research participants, concrete field experiences, and modes of generating and recording empirical materials. No qualitative method rests on pure induction - the questions we ask of the empirical world frame what we know of it. In short, we share in constructing what we deifne as data. Similarly, our conceptual categories arise through our interpretations of data rather than emanating from them or from our methodological practices. (pp. 509-10)

Grounded theory - has a past

Grounded studies emerge from wrestling with data, making comparisons, developing categories, engaging in theoretical sampling, and integrating an analysis. But how weconduct all these activities does not occur in a social vacuum. Rather, the entire research process is interactive; in this sense, we bring past interactions and current interests into our research, and we interact with our empirical materials and emerging ideas as well as, perhaps, granting agencies, institutional review boards, and community agencies and grous, along with research participants and colleagues. Neither data nor ideas are mere objects that we passively observe and compile. (p. 510)

Rather than abandoning the traditional positivist quest for empirical detail, I argue that we advance it - without the cloak of neutrality and passivity enshrouding mid-century positivism. Gathering rich empirical materials is the first step. Recording these data systematically prompts us to pursue leads that we might otherwise ignore or not realize. Through making systematic recordings, we also gain comparitative materials to pinpoint contextual conditions and to explore links between levels of analysis. By seeking empirical answers to emerging theoretical questions, we learn about the worlds we enter and can increase the cogency of our subsequent analyses. Hence, data need to be informed by our theroetical sesitivity. Data alone are insuffiicent; they must be telling and must answer theoretical questions. (p. 511)

Charmaz, K. (2005) Grounded theory in the 21st century: Applications for advancing social justice issues. In Denzin, N.K. & Lincoln, Y.S. (Ed) The SAGE handbook of qualitative research 3rd Edition, Sage Publications, California, USA.

Mindful Inquiry: A Learner-Centered Approach to Qualitative Research (paper)

With thanks to Adair Linn Nagata

Mindful inquiry combines the Buddhist concept of mindfulness with phenomenology, critical theory, and hermeneutics in a process that puts the inquirer in the center(Bentz & Shapiro, 1998, p. 171). Mindful Inquiry helped me develop both reflexivity and voice and resulted in personal transformation especially valuable in researching intercultural interactions.

Mindful Inquiry (MI)

MI is based on 13 philosophical assumptions that are listed here.

1. Awareness of self and reality and their interaction is a positive value in itself and should be present in research processes.


2. Tolerating and integrating multiple perspectives is a value.


3. It is important to bracket our assumptions and look at the often unaware, deep layers of consciousness and unconsciousness that underlie them.


4. Human existence, as well as research, is an ongoing process of interpreting both one’s self and others, including other cultures and subcultures.


5. All research involves both accepting bias––the bias of one’s own situation and context––and trying to transcend it.


6. We are always immersed in and shaped by historical, social, economic, political, and cultural structures and constraints, and those structures and constraints sually have domination and oppression, and therefore suffering, built into them.


7. Knowing involves caring for the world and the human life that one studies.


8. The elimination or dimunition of suffering is an important goal of or value accompanying inquiry and often involves critical judgment about how much suffering is required by existing arrangements.


9. Inquiry often involves the critique of existing values, social and personal illusions, and harmful practices and institutions.


10. Inquiry should contribute to the development of awareness and self-reflection in the inquirer and may contribute to the development of spirituality.


11. Inquiry usually requires giving up ego or transcending self, even though it is grounded in self and requires intensified self-awareness.


12. Inquiry may contribute to social action and be part of social action.


13. The development of awareness is not a purely intellectual or cognitive process but part of a person’s total way of living her life. (Bentz & Shapiro,1998, pp. 6-7)

MI is based on four knowledge traditions which Bentz and Shapiro describe as follows:

• Phenomenology: a description and analysis of consciousness and experience


• Hermeneutics: analysis and interpretation of texts in context


• Critical Social Theory: analysis of domination and oppression with a view to changing it


• Buddhism: spiritual practice that allows one to free oneself from suffering and illusion in several ways, e.g., becoming more aware (1998, p. 6)

Originally I thought that I would produce a competency model that could be the basis for training courses, but the main result of my efforts is an appreciation for a different way of being and relating. Simply stated, a transformation occurred while I was immersed in trying to understand how to relate more skillfully.

I do not have time to really go into what I came to understand about resonance, but let me try to summarize it in three points. I was particularly interested in three aspects of the phenomenon of resonance.

• Intrapersonal Level: Promotion of an internal state that can contribute to a
  kind of inner peace, pursued through self-cultivation


• Interpersonal Level: Relational attunement, an experience of synchrony
  between two people that provides the basis for mutuality


• Research Application: A characteristic of good qualitative
  research

I want to emphasize again the advantages I see of using MI for intercultural communication research. It offers a learner-centered approach to personally important questions, a holistic approach for inquiring into complex, multilayered interactions with the added bonus of providing a method of self-cultivation for you as an interculturalist. Because MI allows you to investigate phenomena that really matter to you, it can also help reveal the real, deeply personal meaning of your research.

Bentz, V. M., & Shapiro, J. J. (1998). Mindful inquiry in social research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Nagata, A.L. (2002) Mindful Inquiry: A Learner-Centered Approach to Qualitative Research,Keynote at 2002 SIETAR Japan Conference.

The Practice of Practice (paper)

A quick re-visit to knowing

With thanks to Max van Manen

The prominance of practice

With some authors the discourse of practice is especially associated with critical theory, postmodernist and deconstructionist writing. In the work of other authors we encounter a more commonplace usage of "the practice of teaching," analogous to the practice of religion or the practice of medicine. Similarly, the educational nomenclature such as "moral practice," "reflective practice," "critical practice" stands for the range of possible actions and vocabularies that these terms evoke. So it appears that practice has become a buzz-word.

Practice as explanation stopper

Another interesting feature is that practices, in this more fundamental sense (as reproductive dispositions, language games, genealogies, or embedded vocabularies) are not directly accessible, observable, measurable, definable. Rather, they are hidden, tacit, often linguistically inexpressible in a direct or propositional sense.

The important point is that while in educational discourses the term practice may be a gloss, it does hide a complex and fascinating pedagogical reality.

Lived practice

At the micro level of the practice of teaching there are layers of action and mutual understanding that are instantly and often unreflectively realized in everything that teachers do in constantly changing situations.

(Un)refective practice

It seems therefore that, on the one hand, the theory of reflective practice seems to overestimate the possibility of introspective "reflection on action while acting" (van Manen 1994, 1995). Phenomenologically it is very difficult, if not impossible, for teachers to be emersed in interactive or dialogic activities with their students while simultaneously stepping back from the activity. On the other hand, the theory of reflective practice seems to underestimate the complexity of the organization of ordinary teaching practices, and the incredible intricacies of practical actions in teaching-learning situations. I would argue that the practice of teaching is so challenging not only because it is cognitively complex but also because the knowledge that inheres in our practices is in part noncognitive...

Knowledge in practice

This is how I would make sense of these forms of noncognitive knowing:

(a) Knowledge resides in action as lived, e.g.,- as confidence in acting, style, and practical tact- as habituations and routine practices

(b) Knowledge resides in the body, e.g.,- as an immediate corporeal sense of things- as gestures and demeanor

(c) Knowledge resides in the world, e.g.,- as being with the things of our world- as situations of at homeness, dwelling

(d) Knowledge resides in relations, e.g.,- as encounter with others- as relations of trust, recognition, intimacy

By noncognitive I mean then that in their practice experienced teachers commonly demonstrate a kind of confidence that is really a form of knowing except that this "knowledge" cannot necessarily be captured in words.

In short, the study of the practice of teaching would need to be sensitive to the experiential quality of practical knowledge: the acknowledgement that much of knowing what to do, ensues from the complex dimensions of practice: one's body, actions, relations, and the things of one's world.

Complexity in practice

Teaching techniques employed by different teachers may look behaviorally the same on the outside but individual teachers always have acquired and developed these practices in a personal manner–sometimes in entirely different biographical and situational settings. Thus, particular practices get embodied in the context of personal life histories and backgrounds, and these practices become habituated in uniquely different situational and relational spheres.

Van Manen, M. (1994). Pedagogy, virtue, and narrative identity in teaching, Curriculum Inquiry, OISE/John Wiley (Toronto), Summer 1994, Vol. 4, No. 2. pp. 135-170.

Van Manen, M. (1995) On the Epistemology of Reflective Practice. Teachers and Teaching: theory and practice. Oxford Ltd. Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 33-50.

Van Manen, M. (1999) The Practice of Practice.In: Lange, Manfred; Olson, John, Hansen, Henning & BŸnder, Wolfgang (eds.): Changing Schools/Changing Practices: Perspectives on Educational Reform and Teacher Professionalism. Luvain, Belgium: Garant.

Rethinking Critical Theory and Qualitative Research (paper)

Notes from Handbook of Qualitative Research - Ch. 12

Critical Ethnography

As critical researchers attempt to get behind the curtain, to move beyond assimilated experience,to expose the way ideology constrains the the desire for self-direction, and to confront the way power reproduces itself in the construction of human consciousness, they employ a plethora of research methodologies. (p. 324)

Catalytic validity points to the degree to which research moves those it studies to understand the world and the way it is shaped in order for them to transform it... ...Research that possesses catalytic validity will not only display the reality-altering of the inquiry process; it will also direct this impact so that those under study will gain self-understanding and self-direction. (p. 324)

To construct a socially critical epistemology, critical ethnographers need to understand holistic modes of human experience and their relationship to communicative structures. (p. 328)

Kincheloe, J.L. & McLaren, P. (2005) Rethinking critical theory and qualitative research. In Denzin, N.K. & Lincoln, Y.S. (Ed) The SAGE handbook of qualitative research 3rd Edition, Sage Publications, California, USA.

Ethics and Politics in Qualitative Research (paper)

Notes from Handbook of Qualitative Research - Ch. 6

I have chosen to pick out some bits on ethics and research - again starting with the the basic:

Codes of Ethics

In value-free social science, codes of ethics for professional and academic associations are the conventional format for moral principals.

Informed consent

Proper respect for human freedom generally includes two necessary conditions. First, subjects must agree freely voluntarily to participate - that is, without physical or psychological coercion. Second, their agreement must be based on full and open information. (p. 145)

Deception

...deliberate misrepresentation is forbidden. (p. 145)

Privacy and confidentiality

Confidentiality must be assured as the primary safeguard against unwanted exposure. All personal data ought to be secured or concealed and made public only behind a shield of anonymity. Professional etiquette uniformly concurs that no one deserves harm or embarrassment as a result of research practices. (p. 145)

Accuracy

Fabrications, fraudulent materials, omissions, and contrivances are both nonscientific and unethical. (p. 145)

I think it is easy to see how all of these have to be considered during research and how if they are not the validity of inquiry can be compromised. As Christians (2005) says himself when these inhabit the living world of research then they generate complex issues. In particular, I don't intend to have a value-free approach - however what is valued must be explicit and considered by participants. Each aspect of a code such as this can be broken only in the light of a greater ethic associated with valuing participants and their shared understanding.


Feminist Communitarianism

Social ethics

Over the past decade, social and feminist ethics have made a radical break with individual autonomy and rationalist presumption of canonical ethics... (pp. 148-9)

Rather than searching for neutral principles to which all parties can appeal, social ethics rests on a complex view of moral judgments as integrating into an organic whole various perspectives - everyday experience, beliefs about the good, and feelings of approval and shame - in terms of human relations and structures. (p. 149)

Compassion and nurturance resolve conflicting responsibilities among people, and as such these standards are totally the opposite of merely avoiding harm. (p. 149)

Accumulated wisdom, moral meaning from our own choices of decency, and the ongoing summons of the Other together reintroduce love, happiness, sympathy, and beauty into a modern, nonabsolutionist, but principled theory of morals. (p. 149)

Humans are defined as communicative beings within the fabric of everyday life. Through dialogic encounter, subjects create life together and nurture one another's moral obligation to it. Levinas's ethics presumes and articulates a radical ontology of social beings in relation. (p. 150)

A Feminist Communitarian Model

...the mission of social science research is enabling community life to prosper - equipping people to come to mutually held conclusions. The aim is not fulsome data per se, but community transformation. The received view assumes that research advances society's interests by feeding our individual capacity to reason and make calculated decisions. Research is intended to be collaborative in its design and participatory in its execution. Rather than ethics codes in the files of academic offices and research reports prepared for clients, the participants themselves are given a forum to activate polis mutually. In contrast to utilitarian experimentalism, the substantive conceptions of the good that drive the problems reflects the conceptions of the community rather than the expertise researchers or funders. (p. 151)

Interpretive Sufficiency

In contrast to an experimentalism of instrumental efficiency, this paradigm seeks to open up the social world in all its dynamic dimensions. The thick notion of sufficiency supplants the thinness of technical , exterior, and statistically precise received view. Rather than reducing social issues to financial and administrative problems for politicians, social science research enables people to come to terms with their everyday experience themselves. (p. 151)

Interpretative sufficiency means taking seriously lives that are loaded with multiple interpretations and grounded in cultural complexity. (p. 152)

Multivocal and Cross-Cultural Representation

With the starting hypothesis that all human cultures have something to say, social science research recognizes particular cultural values consistent with universal human dignity. Interpretative sufficiency in its multicultural dimension locates persons in a non-competitive, non-hierarchical relationship to the larger moral universe. It helps persons imagine how things could be different in the everyday world. It imagines new forms of human transformation and emancipation. It enacts those transformations through dialogue. (p. 153)

Moral Discernment

Communities are woven together by narratives that invigorate their common understanding of good and evil, happiness and reward, the meaning of life and death. Recovering and refashioning moral vocabulary help to amplify our deepest humanness. Researchers are not constituted as ethical selves antecedently, but moral discernment unfolds dialectically between researchers. (p. 154)

Our widely shared moral convictions are developed through discourse within a community. These communities, where moral discourse is nurtured and shared, are a radical alternative to the utilitarianism of modernity. But in feminist communitarianism, communities are entered from the universal. The total opposite of an ethics of individual autonomy is universal human solidarity. Our obligation to sustain one another defines our existence. (p. 154)

OK - that is enough for now. Time for a walk...


Christians, C.G. (2005) Ethics and politics in qualitative research. In Denzin, N.K. & Lincoln, Y.S. (Ed) The SAGE handbook of qualitative research 3rd Edition, Sage Publications, California, USA.