Assertion and interpretation

Assertion is not a free-floating kind of behaviour which in its own right, might be capable of disclosing entities in general in a primary way: on the contrary it always maintains itself on the basis of Being-in-the-world... ...any assertion requires a fore-having of whatever is disclosed; and this is what it points out by way of giving something a definite character... ...Thus any assertion requires fore-sight; in this the predicate which we assign and make stand out, gets loosened, so to speak, from its unexpressed inclusion in the entity itself. (p. 199)

When an assertion is made, some fore-conception is always implied; but it remains for the most part inconspicuous, because the language already hides in itself a developed way of conceiving. Like any interpretation whatever, assertion necessarily has fore-having, a fore-sight, and a fore-conception as its existential foundations. (p. 199)

...assertion cannot disown its ontological origin from an interpretation which understands. (p. 201)

Between the kind of interpretation which is still wholly wrapped up in the concernful understanding and the extreme opposite case of a theoretical assertion about something present-at-hand, there are many intermediate graduations: assertions about the happenings in the environment, accounts of the ready-to-hand, 'reports on the Situation', the recording and fixing of the 'facts of the case', the description of a state of affairs, the narration of something that has befallen. We cannot trace back these 'sentences' to theoretical statements without essentially perverting their meaning. Like the theoretical statements themselves, they have their 'source' in circumspective interpretation. (p. 201)

The λόγος gets experienced as something present-at-hand and Interpreted as such, while at the same time the entities which it points out have the meaning of presence-at-hand. This meaning of Being is left undifferentiated and uncontrasted with other possibilities of Being, so that Being in the sense of a formal Being-something becomes fused with it simultaneously, and we are able even to obtain a clear-cut division between these two realms. (p. 203)

I need to reflect and explore further assertion, interpretation and learning. Certainly what is being described here in reminiscent of learning. Reflecting on playfulness, freedom and learning; it will be interesting to see whether the tenuous associations so far explored can maintain and strengthen themselves as they unfold and enfold. Or will something new emerge?

Back to Being and Time - Assertion (Judgment)

From a previous blog:

This process of interpretation and building meaning could be one way of starting to define learning.

The ability to move between possible interpretations and meanings is a freedom and requires playfulness. In this sense the understanding could be freedom - understanding and choosing possibilities as possibilities.

Learning can be assisted by the freedom to move between, subsume and synthesise interpretations and meanings.

On further reflection, it is hard to imagine learning without understanding and pursuing possibilities as possibilities that is freedom as I have started to define it.

Heidegger introduces us to a place for 'assertion' (judgment?):

All interpretation is grounded on understanding. That which has been articulated as such in interpretation and sketched out beforehand in the understanding in general as something articulable, is the meaning. In so far as assertion ('judgment') is grounded on understanding and presents us with a derivative form in which an interpretation has been carried out, it too 'has' a meaning. Yet this meaning cannot be defined as something which occurs 'in' a judgment along with judging itself. (p. 195)

In what follows, we give three significations to the term "assertion". These are drawn from the phenomenon which is thus designated, they are connected among themselves, and in their unity they encompass the full structure of assertion.

1. The primary signification of "assertion" is "pointing out". In this we adhere to the primordial meaning of... ...letting and entity be seen for itself. I the assertion 'The hammer is too heavy', what is discovered for sight is not a 'meaning', but an entity in the way that it is ready-to-hand'...

2. "Assertion" means no less than "predication". We 'assert' a 'predicate' of a 'subject', and the 'subject' is given a definite character by the 'predicate'. In this signification of "assertion", that which is put forward as assertion is not the predicate, but 'the hammer itself'... ...Every predication is what it is, only as a pointing-out. The second signification of "assertion" has its foundation in the first. Within this pointing-out, the elements which are Articulated in predication - the subject and predicate - arise. It is not by giving something a definite character that we first discover that which shows itself - the hammer - as such; but when we give it such a character, our seeing gets restricted to it in the first instance, so that by this explicit restriction of our view, that which is manifest may be explicitly manifest in its definite character. In giving something a definite character, we must, in the first instance, take a step back when confronted with that which is already manifest - the hammer is too heavy. In 'setting down the subject', we dim entities down to focus in 'that hammer there', so that by thus dimming the, down we let that which is manifest be seen in its own definite character as a character that can be determined. Setting down the subject, setting down the predicate, and setting down the two together, are thoroughly 'apophantical' in the strict sense of the word.

3. "Assertion" means "communication". As communication, it is directly related to "assertion" in the first and second significations. It is letting someone see with us what we have pointed out by way of giving it a definite character... ...That which is put forward in the is something which can be passed along in 'further retelling'. There is a widening of the range of that mutual sharing which sees. But at the same time, what has been pointed out may become veiled again in this further retelling, although even the kind of knowing which arises as hearsay (whether knowledge that something is the case or merely an acquaintance with something always has the entity itself in view and does not 'give assent' to some 'valid meaning' which has been passed around. Even hearsay in a Being-in-the-world, and a Being towards what it has heard. (pp. 196-8)

If we bring together the three significations of 'assertion' which we have analysed, and get a unitary view of the full phenomenon, then we may define "assertion" as "a pointing-out which gives something a definite character and which communicates". (p. 199)

A brief methodology...

Freedom, playfulness and learning have deep significance for me personally. In order to inquire into these in a meaningful manner I will first have to consider my own relationship with them. It seems natural to consider these through narratives which can be interpreted in light of others exploration on playfulness and freedom. These narratives will be inspired by further interpretation of works by philosophers and researchers who have detailed their own perspectives on freedom, including Martin Heidegger (2002, 1982), John Dewey (1989), Maxine Greene (1988) and Rudolf Steiner (1964, 1894). Other texts to inform the narratives will come from stories from my own practice and personal histories.

This autoethnographic (Chase, 2006, p. 660) approach will aim to envisage frames-of-understanding which can be shared, reflected on and reshaped by others within my community of practice. These frames-of-understanding will have their own shared narratives and interpretations informing how they might be shared and utilised within a wider community. This process of framing, sharing, re-framing and sharing again is intended to provide direction and motive for my research. Distinctions between methodology and subject of the research will be interdependent. These interdependencies are worthwhile and necessary to consider themselves. For example, by reflecting on the four traditions that inform Valerie Bentz and Jeremy Shapiro’s Mindful Inquiry,

• Phenomenology: a description and analysis of consciousness and experience


• Hermeneutics: analysis and interpretation of texts in context


• Critical Social Theory: analysis of domination and oppression with a view to changing it


• Buddhism: spiritual practice that allows one to free oneself from suffering and illusion in several ways, e.g., becoming more aware (Bentz & Shapiro, 1998, p. 6),

the methodologies outlined so far have strong resonances with all of these traditions, as does the research itself. All participants will be following, but not limited to, aspects these traditions. Indeed the frames-of-understanding in themselves will in all probability owe some gratitude to them. The research will be guided, honed and sustained through its own logic of understanding.

And a further note:

From my research there should be some direction in enabling what Parker J. Palmer describes as ‘Good talk about good pedagogy’ (1998, p. 144). With appropriate playfulness, possibility should emerge from the communities closest to the practice – which by its nature and manifestation is problematic. The participants will be given a voice through reflection on and application of the metaphors of freedom and playfulness, with the specific ambition of assisting them with improving their practice. Through their voices, it is intended, that a sharable and accessible frame-of-understanding for transforming practice will be described, tested and refined.

How might freedom, playfulness and learning within practice be shared?

Explorations of philosophical perspectives on freedom, playfulness and learning become more interesting and intriguing when considering how they may relate to practice. For anyone involved in educational practice there are many possibilities, of which only a few may be pursued. There are many ways that the choice to move between these possibilities may be limited, through intrinsic, perceived or extrinsic factors. Using the shared metaphors associated with playfulness and freedom could provide a catalyst for possibility. Some aspects of practice may mirror playfulness as a state-of-mind. For example Max van Manen (1999) examines some of what is intangible within practice – outlining practice as explanation stopper, practice as lived experience, (un)reflective practice and the complexity of practice. On (un)reflective practice he states:

…the theory of reflective practice seems to overestimate the possibility of introspective "reflection on action while acting" (van Manen 1994, 1995). Phenomenologically it is very difficult, if not impossible, for teachers to be immersed in interactive or dialogic activities with their students while simultaneously stepping back from the activity. (van Manen, 1999)

Supporting teachers while they explore and embody the complexity and variety of learning in practice provides the environment for this study. It also provides direction for inquiry. If it is impossible to be reflective when immersed within practice then where does that leave the practitioner? Do they feel free to:

enable students to learn – can practice have playfulness as its state-of-mind?
act or do they feel played within games of their own or others construction?
explore their own and shared possibility?